Iran: Going It Alone?

Rebecca from Revka's Take had a good question in the comment section of my last post:

"Why do you think he (Iran's President Ahmadinejad) is saying all this crazy stuff in the media if he has 'just begun' his uranium enrichment? I would think he would have kept his mouth shut about his intentions until he was real close to getting a nuke, or has already had one from another source. I tend to think based on his actions, that he already has the plan in place and had other nations in bed with him on it. What do you think?"

Excellent question! I have an inquiring mind, so I began to inquire.

The Jewish Virtual Library has this to say about Iran, sourced from a CIA report published in November of 2004:

Iran continued to vigorously pursue indigenous programs to produce nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Iran is also working to improve delivery systems as well as ACW. To this end, Iran continued to seek foreign materials, training, equipment, and know-how. During the reporting period, Iran still focused particularly on entities in Russia, China, North Korea, and Europe. Iran's nuclear program received significant assistance in the past from the proliferation network headed by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan.

Nuclear. The United States remains convinced that Tehran has been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program, in contradiction to its obligations as a party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). During 2003, Iran continued to pursue an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle ostensibly for civilian purposes but with clear weapons potential. International scrutiny and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and safeguards will most likely prevent Tehran from using facilities declared to the IAEA directly for its weapons program as long as Tehran remains a party to the NPT. However, Iran could use the same technology at other, covert locations for military applications.

Iran continues to use its civilian nuclear energy program to justify its efforts to establish domestically or otherwise acquire the entire nuclear fuel cycle. Iran claims that this fuel cycle would be used to produce fuel for nuclear power reactors, such as the 1,000-megawatt light-water reactor that Russia is continuing to build at the southern port city of Bushehr. However, Iran does not need to produce its own fuel for this reactor because Russia has pledged to provide the fuel throughout the operating lifetime of the reactor and is negotiating with Iran to take back the irradiated spent fuel. An Iranian opposition group, beginning in August of 2002, revealed several previously undisclosed Iranian nuclear facilities, sparking numerous IAEA inspections since February 2003. Subsequent reports by the IAEA Director General revealed numerous failures by Iran to disclose facilities and activities, which run contrary to its IAEA safeguards obligations. Before the reporting period, the A. Q. Khan network provided Iran with designs for Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced and efficient models, and components.

This report states further:

Chemical. Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued to seek production technology, training, and expertise from foreign entities that could further Tehran's efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents. Iran may have already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and possibly nerve agents-and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them-which it previously had manufactured.

Biological. Even though Iran is part of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Tehran probably maintained an offensive BW program. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise that could be used in Tehran's BW program. Iran probably has the capability to produce at least small quantities of BW agents.

Advanced Conventional Weapons. Iran continued to seek and acquire conventional weapons and production technologies, primarily from Russia, China, and North Korea. Tehran also sought high-quality products, particularly weapons components and dual-use items, or products that proved difficult to acquire through normal governmental channels.

Question for my readers: if Russia, China and North Korea, all loving regimes, are supplying Iran with "conventional" weapons, can you do the logical extension?

Let's look at other reports and articles. From the BBC:

But Iran does not have a significant and established nuclear reactor programme, and in economic and practical terms establishing an enrichment facility cannot be justified. That means the enrichment facility is almost certainly for a nuclear weapons programme.

The article asks: where did Iran get the know-how to build a nuclear industry? Another excellent question. Their answer:

So to establish the plants and factories required, Iran has had to undertake a clandestine programme of acquisition of the hardware and technical knowledge. The most obvious candidates for this are Russia and China.

However, Russia has agreed to confine its nuclear interests in Iran to the construction of nuclear power plants and recent agreements between Iran and China have fallen through. Another possibility is that a deal has been struck with a third nuclear developing state such as Pakistan or North Korea.

It is also possible that some of the equipment and specialised materials needed have been acquired under apparently legitimate contract with the West but which has dual-use capability.

Russia, China, North Korea, Pakistan -- I see some consistencies here.

From John Bolton's speech to the Hudson Institute in Washington, DC on August 17, 2004:

Another potential source of plutonium for (Iranian) weapons is the Bushehr light-water power reactor, which is currently under construction. That reactor is under IAEA safeguards. Russia has agreed to provide all fresh fuel for that reactor, and Iran and Russia are discussing an agreement to return all spent fuel to Russia. However, if Iran should withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty ("NPT") and renounce this agreement with Russia, the Bushehr reactor would produce enough plutonium each year for about 30 nuclear weapons.

It would also appear that nuclear parts shipped to other countries may miraculously have been "diverted" to Iran as well. From Regime Change Iran:

Critical components and specialized tools destined for Libya's nuclear weapons program disappeared before arrival in 2003 and international investigators now suspect that they were diverted to another country, according to court records and investigators.

The seizure by the United States and Britain of a separate shipment of nuclear-related components from a freighter headed for Libya in October 2003 crippled the network and led to Khan's admission that he had been selling know-how and technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya.

Since then, the biggest concerns for international inspectors and intelligence agencies examining Khan's operation have been whether an unidentified customer is also pursuing a nuclear weapon or whether Iran might have received the missing technology and, potentially, designs for an atomic weapon.

A non-Western intelligence official said it was possible that the missing centrifuge components and other material was sold secretly to Iran by someone in the Khan network as the operation started to unravel after the seizure of the shipment in 2003.

Even back in 2003, Bloomberg.com wrote:

Oct. 14 (Bloomberg) -- Iran may develop usable nuclear weapons within two years using technology from countries including Russia, China and France, an Iranian opposition group said. The National Council of Resistance of Iran, founded in Tehran and now based in Paris, made the assertion two weeks before the expiration of a United Nations' deadline for the country to prove it isn't developing nuclear weapons.

"The Iranian regime is sparing no effort in its drive to acquire nuclear weapons,'' Dowlat Nowrouzi, a council member, told reporters in London. Asked when the regime would succeed, she said: "Our prediction is 2005, 2006.''

Timely prediction, eh?

Also, here is an excellent capsulization of Iran's nuclear chronology.

On this afternoon's Michael Medved show, Senator John McCain said that, regarding Iraq, the only thing worse than sanctions or a military option is a nuclear-armed Iran disturbing the entire Middle East -- but that nations must present a unified, solid front for Iran to take notice.

The clock continues to tick.

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Also, in brief:

• The Senate Judiciary Committe votes to confirm Alito, precisely along party lines.
• The New York Times 4th quarter earnings have plunged 41%.
• Iran has pressed OPEC to reduce oil production by 1 million barrels per day.
• LA Times writer Joel Stein says he does not support our troops.

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It just tickles me that the DEM continues, reliably, to implode.