How To Deal With Iran; Disparate Training Manuals

A confrontation between the US and Iran simply seems imminent to me, and appears to be only a matter of time before it occurs.

Iran, as you must all realize by now, is the Puppet Master pulling many if not all of the Islamist strings in the Middle East.




Blogfather Hugh Hewitt features a link on his blog which portrays information by historian Arthur Herman dealing with solutions to the Iran Issue. I read the article (Getting Serious About Iran: A Military Option) and was sufficiently impressed that I wish to portray a portion of the article here for your perusal and input:

The first step would be to make it clear that the United States will tolerate no action by any state that endangers the international flow of commerce in the Straits of Hormuz. Signaling our determination to back up this statement with force would be a deployment in the Gulf of Oman of minesweepers, a carrier strike group’s guided-missile destroyers, an Aegis-class cruiser, and anti-submarine assets, with the rest of the carrier group remaining in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. Navy could also deploy UAV’s (unmanned air vehicles) and submarines to keep watch above and below against any Iranian missile threat to our flotilla.

Our next step would be to declare a halt to all shipments of Iranian oil while guaranteeing the safety of tankers carrying non-Iranian oil and the platforms of other Gulf states. We would then guarantee this guarantee by launching a comprehensive air campaign aimed at destroying Iran’s air-defense system, its air-force bases and communications systems, and finally its missile sites along the Gulf coast. At that point the attack could move to include Iran’s nuclear facilities—not only the “hard” sites but also infrastructure like bridges and tunnels in order to prevent the shifting of critical materials from one to site to another.

Above all, the air attack would concentrate on Iran’s gasoline refineries. It is still insufficiently appreciated that Iran, a huge oil exporter, imports nearly 40 percent of its gasoline from foreign sources, including the Gulf states. With its refineries gone and its storage facilities destroyed, Iran’s cars, trucks, buses, planes, tanks, and other military hardware would run dry in a matter of weeks or even days. This alone would render impossible any major countermoves by the Iranian army. (For its part, the Iranian navy is aging and decrepit, and its biggest asset, three Russian-made Kilo-class submarines, should and could be destroyed before leaving port.)

The scenario would not end here. With the systematic reduction of Iran’s capacity to respond, an amphibious force of Marines and special-operations forces could seize key Iranian oil assets in the Gulf, the most important of which is a series of 100 offshore wells and platforms built on Iran’s continental shelf. North and South Pars offshore fields, which represent the future of Iran’s oil and natural-gas industry, could also be seized, while Kargh Island at the far western edge of the Persian Gulf, whose terminus pumps the oil from Iran’s most mature and copiously producing fields (Ahwaz, Marun, and Gachsaran, among others), could be rendered virtually useless. By the time the campaign was over, the United States military would be in a position to control the flow of Iranian oil at the flick of a switch.

An operational fantasy? Not in the least. The United States did all this once before, in the incident I have already alluded to. In 1986-88, as the Iran-Iraq war threatened to spill over into the Gulf and interrupt vital oil traffic, the United States Navy stepped in, organizing convoys and re-flagging ships to protect them against vengeful Iranian attacks. When the Iranians tried to seize the offensive, U.S. vessels sank one Iranian frigate, crippled another, and destroyed several patrol boats. Teams of SEALS also shelled and seized Iranian oil platforms. The entire operation, the largest naval engagement since World War II, not only secured the Gulf; it also compelled Iraq and Iran to wind down their almost decade-long war. Although we made mistakes, including most grievously the accidental shooting-down of a civilian Iranian airliner, killing everyone on board, the world economic order was saved—the most important international obligation the United States faced then and faces today.

Mr. Herman advocates clear, specific, ulilateral and immediate action.

Considering the information the Saudis have proffered regarding their take on defeating Iran should the US pull out of Iraq (see my post on this) -- should Herman's point become US policy regarding both Iran and Iraq?

My opinion?

This needs to fly and it needs to fly NOW. No one, no nation, possesses the inherent air and sea superiority that we possess now, despite our being down in count on Blue Water vessels as compared to the 80's.

Who depends on Iranian oil? Would it surprise you that this might be China?

The US in Chinese clutches?

How about China in US clutches?

And instead of the United States becoming REACTIVE -- just as GWB grasped -- how about the United States becoming PROACTIVE?

COMPARISON OF THE MANUALS:

The United States decided it was time to update their Counter-Insurgency Manual.

Go here.

Al Qaeda already has a training manual.

Go here.

As my college instructor once said: "Compare and contrast."

BZ